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Abstract
In this paper we consider the security of two recently proposed anonymous
conference key distribution schemes. We show that neither scheme is as prac-
tical as the authors claim and that, in certain circumstances, both schemes
also suffer from security vulnerabilities. We also show that the attack de-
scribed in one paper is invalid.
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1 Introduction
In [1], Yang, Chang and Hwang propose a new anonymous conference key
distribution system (referred to here as the YCH scheme). The authors claim
that this scheme is efficient, secure, and provides user anonymity, based on
the intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. However,
we show below that this scheme is not efficient, because every conferee must,
on average, try n+1
2
times to get the session key, where n is the size of the
conference. We also show that, in certain circumstances, malicious users can
successfully manipulate the session key for the conference.
In [2], Lin, Lin and Lee describe an attack on the scheme in [1] and propose
an improved anonymous conference key distribution system (referred to here
as the LLL scheme) based on the YCH scheme. However, we show that their
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attack is incorrect and cannot be used to attack the YCH scheme. The new
LLL scheme also suffers from the same efficiency and security problems as
the YCH scheme does.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a concise
description of the YCH scheme and the LLL scheme. In Section 3, we describe
a general model for both schemes. In Section 4, we give our comments on
both schemes. In Section 5, a brief conclusion is provided.
2 Description of the YCH and LLL schemes
Both schemes involve two kinds of entity, namely the conference chairman
(Uc) and the conferees, and both schemes are composed of three stages: the
system initialisation stage, the conference key distribution stage, and the
conference key recovery stage. The operations in the three stages of both
schemes are basically the same, so we only describe these three stages for the
YCH scheme and point out the differences between them at relevant points.
Suppose that the set of all participants in the system is A = {U1, U2, · · · , Um}.
• In the system initialisation stage, the system publicly chooses an elliptic
curve E over a finite field GF (q) and a base point G ∈ Eq, whose
order is a very large number p. Then the system assigns a secret key
xi ∈ [1, p− 1], the corresponding public key Qi = xiG, and the identity
IDi to participant Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
The operations of this stage in the LLL scheme are identical.
• In the conference key distribution stage, Uc, the conference chairman,
distributes a conference key CK to each participant in the conference,
which, without loss of generality, we denote by Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n, n < m).
Note that in the description we implicitly assume that Uc is not a
member of {U1, U2, · · · , Um} — see also the comments in Section 4.
However, modifying the specification for the case where Uc is a member
of {U1, U2, · · · , Um} would be straightforward.
Uc first randomly chooses a value c1, 0 < c1 < p, and then performs
the following steps for each Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
1. Compute the secret key kci = xcQi, shared by Uc and Ui.
2. Compute the hash value hi = H(kci||IDc||IDi||T )||m, where H is
a secure one-way hash function with fixed-length output, T is a
time-stamp, and || denotes the concatenation operation.
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3. Compute yi = c1hi + CK mod p.
Uc computes V = H(CK||IDc||T ) as a check value for CK and the
time-stamp T , and then broadcasts the message M = {IDc, V, T ,
c1, y1, y2, · · · , yn} to all the conference participants. Note that the iden-
tities of the conference participants are not included in M — this is
to ensure anonymity for the conference participants. However, as we
discuss in more detail below, this means that every recipient of M has
to process each yi in turn to see if the message is intended for them.
The operations of this stage in the LLL scheme are identical except
that, in step 3, yi is computed as yi = (c1hi + CK mod p)⊕ hi, where
⊕ denotes bit-wise exclusive-or.
• In the conference key recovery stage, on receiving the message M =
{IDc, V, T, c1, y1, y2, · · · , yn} each user Uj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) performs the
following steps to determine whether or not they are a member of the
conference and, if so, to recover the conference key CK. Note that Uj
needs to process each value yi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in turn to determine whether
or not this value is intended for Uj, although the authors in [1, 2] do
not point this out.
1. Check the validity of the time-stamp T . If it is invalid, stop the
conference key recovery stage.
2. Compute the key kjc = xjQc shared with Uc.
3. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, perform the following steps using the value
yi:
(a) Compute h′i = H(kjc||IDc||IDj||T )||m, and use it to compute
CK ′ as
CK ′ = yi − c1h′i mod p.
(b) Check the validity of CK ′ by computing H(CK ′||IDc||T ) and
comparing it with V .
(c) If they agree, then Uj knows that it is a member of the confer-
ence and that CK ′ is the valid secret key for the conference;
Uj stops processing in this case. Otherwise Uj continues to
try.
4. If all the iterations of step 3 complete without successfully finding
a valid conference key, then Uj knows that it is not a member of
the conference and stops processing.
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The operations of this stage in the LLL scheme are identical except
that step 3(a) is as follows.
Compute h′i = H(kjc||IDc||IDj||T )||m, and compute CK ′ as
CK ′ = (yi ⊕ hi)− c1h′i mod p.
3 General model for the YCH and LLL schemes
Both the YCH and the LLL schemes conform to the same simple general
model, as follows, where the objective is for a conference chair Uc to share a
conference key CK with all the members of a conference, namely U1, U2,· · ·,
Un.
1. The conference chair Uc shares a secret key Ki with participant Ui,
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. Uc derives a session key hi from Ki and a time-stamp T .
3. For each participant Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n), Uc encrypts CK using the session
key hi, i.e. computes ehi(CK), where e denotes an encryption operation.
4. The conference chair broadcasts y1, y2, · · ·, yn, along with a time-stamp
T , its identifier IDc, and a check value V = H(CK||IDc||T ).
5. Each recipient Ui attempts to decrypt all the values y1, y2, · · ·, yn,
using the secret session key hi, and then in each case checks that the
decrypted value is correct using the check value V .
In addition, both the YCH scheme and the LLL scheme require the secret
keys Ki to be generated by an elliptic curve version of the Diffie-Hellman key
establishment technique. However, the schemes would work in an identical
way if a conventional Diffie-Hellman scheme was used to derive Ki, or even
if they were pre-distributed by some means.
These two schemes differ only in their choices for the encryption operation
e, which are
yj = ehi(CK) = c1hi + CK mod p
and
yj = ehi(CK) = [c1hi + CK mod p]⊕ hi
for the YCH and LLL schemes respectively.
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Note that this means that, for the YCH scheme, a genuine recipient Ui can
use the recovered copy of CK to easily compute all the values hj (j 6= i),
simply by computing hj = (yj − CK)c−11 mod p, where c−11 is the inverse of
c1 modulo p. Recovering the values hj in the LLL scheme is rather more
difficult, although not impossible, since the encryption function e used in
that scheme is still not secure. To see this, observe that if the conference
chair sends out two different conference keys using the same time stamp T ,
and if one user Uj is in both conferences, then detecting this and recovering
the value hj appears straightforward.
4 Comments on the two schemes
We first point out that the specifications of both schemes are incomplete.
1. Firstly, for neither scheme is it specified whether Uc is a member of the
underlying conference and how the key pair (xc, Qc) is generated. As
noted above, for the purposes of this paper we have assumed that Uc
is not a member of {U1, U2, · · · , Um}.
2. Secondly, it is not at all clear why (in step 2 of the key distribution
stage) the value of m, the total number of participants in the scheme,
is appended to the hash-code to derive hi. This does not appear to in-
crease the security of the scheme or play any other useful role. It is also
not specified how m is communicated to the participants — it could,
perhaps, be conveyed at the system initialisation stage, although this
would forcem to be static, and prevent the addition of new participants
in the scheme.
We also have the following comments on both schemes.
1. In [2], the authors claim that, using the message
M = {IDc, V, T, c1, y1, y2, · · · , yn},
an attacker can learn the parameters hi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) by first solving the
n equations:
yi = c1hi + CK mod p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
then eliminating CK from these equations to derive a set of n equations
of the form (yi − yi+1) = c1(hi − hi+1) mod p, and finally solving these
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equations to yield the n unknowns hi, and hence the secret key CK.
However, they fail to observe that the derived equations are linearly
dependent, and hence cannot be uniquely solved. In fact, it should be
clear that any value of CK will be consistent with these equations.
2. We argue that the computational complexity for each participant in
the conference key recovery stage specified in part 5 of [1] is incorrect.
The authors claim that the total computational complexity for each
participant is TEC MUL + 2tH + TMUL, where TEC MUL, TH and TMUL
are the time for computation of elliptic curve multiplication, the hash
function H, and modular multiplication, respectively. But, in the con-
ference key recovery stage of the scheme in [1], a recipient of M cannot
immediately determine which yi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (if any) is for him. He
must try every yi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in step 3 and then check the validity of
his result. The expected number of tries to successfully get the session
key CK is n+1
2
, which will be a heavy burden for the conferees if n
is very large. The new scheme in [2] also suffers from this efficiency
problem.
3. The reformulation of the scheme in general terms given in the previous
section shows that neither of the proposed schemes is in any way elliptic
curve specific; the descriptions of the schemes given in the two papers
is thus very misleading. In fact the schemes do not even necessitate
the use of any form of public key cryptography. All that is required is
some means of establishing a shared secret key between the conference
chair and each participant. This could be achieved using an arbitrary
asymmetric key establishment scheme, or even pre-established shared
secrets.
In addition, both schemes suffer from security vulnerabilities in certain cir-
cumstances. In the YCH scheme, as we have described above, a malicious
but genuine participant Ui can use the conference key CK to recover the
hj ‘session key’ values for all other participants Uj. Participant Ui can now
use these session keys to reformulate the message M to include a different
conference key CK∗, by sending out modified values y∗j = c1hj +CK
∗ and a
recomputed check value V ∗.
This attack is not so simple for the LLL scheme. However, as we have already
noted, there are circumstances where a similar attack could apply since the
encryption function e for the LLL scheme is still not secure. Such problems
could be avoided by using a secure encryption function, such as AES [3], for
e.
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The schemes as described do not enable the recipient of a broadcast confer-
ence keying message to determine whether or not it has been tampered with;
in particular, the verification value V is not a function of the set of conference
members. Thus the schemes should only ever be used in environments where
such tampering is not a threat, e.g. where communications are protected by
other means.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed two recently proposed anonymous conference
key distribution schemes, and have demonstrated the presence of significant
design vulnerabilities. We also point out that the ‘attack’ in [2] is invalid.
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